Sec Proposes Anticipated Rules on Pay-Versus-Performance Disclosure

On April 29, 2015, the SEC, in a 3-2 vote of the SEC Commissioners, approved proposed rules (the “pay-versus-performance disclosure”) that would require an issuer to disclose the relationship between the issuer’s executive compensation and the issuer’s financial performance. The proposed rules would implement a disclosure obligation required under Section 953(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Chair White noted, in the SEC press release announcing the proposed rules, that the pay-versus-performance disclosure “would better inform shareholders and give them a new metric for assessing a company’s executive compensation relative to its financial performance.”

In particular, the proposed rules would amend Item 402 of Reg. S-K by adding a new Item 402(v) which would require issuers to disclose, in each proxy or information statement requiring executive compensation disclosure under Item 402 of Reg. S-K, the following:

  • the executive compensation “actually paid” to the issuer’s principal executive officer (“PEO”);
  • the executive compensation “actually paid” to the issuer’s named executive officers (“NEOs” ), expressed as an average for all such NEOs;
  • the issuer’s total shareholder return (“TSR” ); and
  • the TSR of a peer group of issuers.

Like all disclosures required under Item 402 of Reg. S-K, the pay-versus-performance disclosure would be subject to the say-on-pay advisory vote.

Compensation Actually Paid

Under the proposed rules, the executive compensation “actually paid” by an issuer means the total compensation for a particular executive disclosed in the summary compensation table adjusted by certain amounts related to pensions and equity awards. The adjusted disclosure represents an attempt by the SEC to reflect the compensation awarded to, or earned by, such executive officer in a particular year of service. In order to calculate the compensation “actually paid” to a particular executive officer, the total compensation disclosed for such executive officer in the summary compensation table would be adjusted to:

  • deduct the aggregate change in the actuarial present value of all defined benefit and actuarial pension plans reported in the Summary Compensation Table;
  • add back the actuarially determined service cost for services rendered by the executive officer during the applicable year;
  • exclude the grant date value of any stock and option awards granted during the applicable year that are subject to vesting; and
  • add back the value at vesting of stock and option awards that vested during the applicable year, computed in accordance with the fair value guidance in FASB ASC Topic 718.

An issuer would need to include footnotes to the pay-versus-performance summary table (see below for the form table) which describes the amounts excluded from and added to the total compensation reported in the summary compensation and the issuer’s vesting date valuation assumptions used (if materially different from the grant date assumptions disclosed in the issuer’s financial statements).

In addition to the required disclosure, an issuer would be permitted to make disclosures to capture the issuer’s specific situation and industry, provided that any supplemental disclosure is not misleading and not presented more prominently than the required pay-versus-performance disclosure. Examples of supplemental disclosure provided in the proposed rules include the disclosure of “realized pay” or “realizable pay” or additional years of data beyond the time periods required.

Peer Group

The peer group utilized for the TSR comparison would be the same peer group used by the issuer in its stock performance graph or in describing the issuer’s benchmarking compensation practices in its CD&A.

Format

The pay-versus-performance disclosure must be provided in tabular form as set forth below.

Year(a) Summary Compensation Table Total For PEO(b) Compensation Actually Paid to PEO(c) Average Summary Compensation Table Total for non PEO Named Executive Officers(d) Average Compensation Actually Paid to non PEO Named Executive Officers(d) Total Shareholder Return(f)

Peer Group Total Shareholder Return

(g)

Following the pay-versus-performance disclosure table, the issuer would be required to describe the relationship between the issuer’s executive compensation actually paid and the issuer’s TSR and the relationship between the issuer’s TSR and the peer group’s TSR.

Issuers will generally need to make the pay-versus-performance disclosure for its five (or three years, in the first applicable filing following the effectiveness of the proposed rule) most recently completed fiscal years.  However, smaller reporting companies will only need to make the disclosure for three years (or two years, in the first applicable filing following the effectiveness of the proposed rule).  In addition, a smaller reporting company would not be required to (i) disclose amounts relating to pensions (consistent with current executive compensation disclosure obligations); nor (ii) present the TSR of a peer group in its pay-versus-performance disclosure.

XBRL

Companies would be required to tag the pay-versus-performance disclosure using XBRL.  Smaller reporting companies would not be required to comply with the tagging requirement until the third filing in which the pay-versus-performance disclosure is provided.

Companies to which Disclosure Requirement Applies

The proposed pay-versus-performance disclosure rules would apply to all reporting companies, except registered investment companies, foreign private issuers and emerging growth companies.

Conclusion

It is unclear whether the pay-versus-performance disclosure will be adopted (and in effect) in time for the 2016 proxy season.  The SEC is seeking comments on the proposed rules for 60 days following their publication in the Federal Register.

NASDAQ Proposal to Amend its Independence Standards for Compensation Committee Members Is Effective

Last week we blogged that NASDAQ proposed to amend its independence standards for compensation committee members, which amendments would align NASDAQ’s approach to compensation committee independence with that employed by the NYSE.   On December 11th, the SEC published a notice of filing and immediate effectiveness of the proposed rule change. Companies are required to comply with the compensation committee independence rules by the earlier of the date of their first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014.

NASDAQ Proposes to Align its Independence Standards for Compensation Committee Members with the NYSE’s Approach to Such Standards

On November 26, 2013, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC proposed to amend its listing rules on compensation committee composition (Rule 5605(d)(2)(A) and IM-5605-6) to replace the prohibition on the receipt of compensatory fees by compensation committee members with a requirement that a board of directors instead consider the receipt of such fees when determining eligibility for compensation committee membership.  NASDAQ cited the feedback that it had received from listed companies as the reason for these changes.  The proposed rules are almost identical to the NYSE’s rules related to compensation committee independence and, if adopted, would remove the anomaly of NASDAQ listing rules being more stringent than NYSE rules.

The proposed Rule 5605(d)(2)(A) states that in affirmatively determining the independence of any compensation committee member, the board must consider all factors specifically relevant to determining whether a director has a relationship to the company which is material to that director’s ability to be independent from management in connection with the duties of a compensation committee member, including, but not limited to:

  • the source of compensation of such director, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the company to such director; and
  • whether such director is affiliated with the company, a subsidiary of the company or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the company.

In IM-5605-6, NASDAQ proposes to clarify that when considering the sources of a director’s compensation in determining compensation committee member independence, the board should consider whether the director receives compensation from any person or entity that would impair the director’s ability to make independent judgments about the company’s executive compensation, including compensation for board or board committee services. 

The approach to the affiliation prong of the independence analysis is not significantly changed in the proposed rules.  However, NASDAQ proposes to revise IM-5605-6 to explain that the board should consider whether the affiliate relationship places the director under the direct or indirect control of the company or its senior management, or creates a direct relationship between the director and members of senior management, in each case of a nature that would impair the director’s ability to make independent judgments about the company’s executive compensation.

Companies are required to comply with the compensation committee composition aspects of the NASDAQ rules by the earlier of their first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014.  NASDAQ intends to implement the proposed changes before companies suggest changes to board and committee composition in connection with their 2014 annual meetings.

Time Period for SEC Action on Exchanges’ Proposed Compensation Committee Rules Was Extended until January 13, 2013

On September 25, 2012, each of The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC and New York Stock Exchange filed with the SEC proposed rules amending their listing standards for compensation committees.  Generally, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SEC should decide whether to approve or disapprove proposed rule changes within 45 days of the publication of notice of the filing of a proposed rule change or within such longer period (up to 90 days) as the SEC may designate.  The 45th day from the publication of notice of filing of the compensation committee proposed rule changes by the exchanges was November 29, 2012. The SEC extended the 45-day time period for SEC action on these proposed rule changes and designated January 13, 2013, as the date by which the SEC should either approve or disapprove these changes.

ISS Releases 2013 Updates to Proxy Voting Guidelines

On November 16, 2012, the ISS released its final 2013 Updates to its U.S. Corporate Governance Policy. ISS also will release a FAQ document in December 2012 for further guidance. The Updates will be effective for meetings on or after February 1, 2013.

Highlights of the 2013 Updates include:

• Stock Pledges/Hedges: In response to comments, ISS will be taking a case-by-case approach in determining whether pledging of company shares rises to a level of serious concern for shareholders. Also in response to comments, ISS is including significant pledging of company stock as a failure of risk oversight and thus considered a governance failure for which directors should be held accountable (rather than communicating concern through a say-on-pay recommendation as originally proposed). However, hedging of company stock, through covered call, collar or other derivative transactions, will be considered a problematic practice warranting a negative voting recommendation on the election of directors.

• Failure to Act on Shareholder Proposals: ISS will keep its current policy in effect for 2013, with some modifications: ISS will recommend a negative vote for individual directors, committee members or the entire board, if the board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of either (i) a majority of the outstanding shares or (ii) a majority of the votes cast in the last year and one of the two previous years. Beginning in 2014, ISS will recommend a vote negative vote if the board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of shares cast in the previous year. Under the Update, the ISS now has the flexibility to recommend a negative vote on members of the board as deemed appropriate, not necessarily the full board. The ISS also has included more guidance on the case-by-case examination of the sufficiency of a company’s action in response to a majority-supported shareholder proposal.

• Peer Groups: The new methodology incorporates information from companies’ self-selected pay benchmarking peer groups in order to identify and prioritize Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry groups beyond the subject company’s own GICS classification. The methodology draws peers from the subject company’s GICS group as well as from GICS groups represented in the company’s peer group, while maintaining the approximate proportions of these industries in the final peer group where possible. The methodology additionally focuses initially at an 8-digit GICS resolution to identify peers that are more closely related in terms of industry. Finally, when selecting peers, the methodology prioritizes peers that maintain the company near the median of the peer group, are in the subject company’s peer group, and that have chosen the subject company as a peer. The peer group methodology maintains its focus on identifying companies that are reasonably similar to the subject company in terms of industry profile, size, and market capitalization. Other changes to the peer group methodology include using slightly relaxed size requirements, especially at very small and very large companies, and using revenue instead of assets for certain financial companies.

• Realizable Pay: Realizable pay is being added to the research report for large capitalization companies. Realizable pay will consist of the sum of relevant cash and equity-based grants and awards made during a specified performance period being measured, based on equity award values for actual earned awards, or target values for ongoing awards, calculated using the stock price at the end of the performance measurement period. Stock options or stock appreciation rights will be revalued using the remaining term and updated assumptions, as of the performance period, using the Black-Scholes Option Pricing model. The realizable pay consideration may mitigate or exacerbate the CEO’s pay for performance concerns.

• Voting on “Say on Golden Parachute” Proposals: The Update will (i) include existing change-in-control arrangements maintained with named executive officers rather than focusing only on new or extended arrangements and (ii) place further scrutiny on multiple legacy problematic features (e.g. single trigger equity, tax gross –ups, etc.) in change in control agreements.

NYSE Amends its Compensation Committee and Committee Adviser Independence Proposed Rules

Yesterday the NYSE filed an amendment to its proposed compensation committee and committee adviser independence rules.  According to the rule filing, the amendment corrects an error in the rule text under the heading “Transition Periods for Compensation Committee Requirements.”  According to the amended rule text, listed companies will have until the earlier of their first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014, to comply with the new director independence standards with respect to compensation committees.  The other proposed rules, including those related to compensation committee advisers, will become effective on July 1, 2013.

NYSE Proposes New Rules Related to Compensation Committee and Committee Adviser Independence

Earlier this week, the NYSE filed proposed rule changes with the SEC related to compensation committee independence and the hiring of compensation advisers.  The NYSE proposed such rules to comply with Exchange Act Rule 10C-1 adopted in June.  Rule 10C-1 requires national securities exchanges to adopt listing standards which effectuate the compensation committee and committee adviser independence requirements of Section 952 of the Dodd-Frank Act.   The NYSE’s proposed rules do not expand upon or vary much from the SEC rules.  The NYSE proposed to have its new listing standards effective on July 1, 2013; however, companies would have until the earlier of their first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014, to comply with the such new standards.  Set forth below is a summary of the NYSE’s proposed rules:

 Compensation Committee Independence

The NYSE proposed rules do not establish any new bright line standards specific to compensation committee independence.  Instead, the NYSE proposed rules require that, in affirmatively determining the independence of any director who will serve on a compensation committee, a listed company’s board “consider all  factors specifically relevant to determining whether a director has a relationship to the listed company which is material to that director’s ability to be independent from management in connection with the duties of a compensation committee member, including, but not limited to, the two factors explicitly enumerated in Rule 10C-1(b)(ii)”:

  • the source of the director’s compensation, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the listed company to such director; and
  • whether the director has an affiliate relationship with the listed company, a subsidiary of the listed company or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the listed company.

The proposing release specifically provides that the NYSE does not believe that board compensation should be considered as part of the independence determination.  Further, commentary to the proposed NYSE rules provides that “the board should consider whether the director receives compensation from any person or entity that would impair his ability to make independent judgments about the listed company’s executive compensation. Similarly, when considering any affiliate relationship a director has with the company, a subsidiary of the company, or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the company, in determining his independence for purposes of compensation committee service,. . . the board should consider whether the affiliate relationship places the director under the direct or indirect control of the listed company or its senior management, or creates a direct relationship between the director and members of senior management, in each case of a nature that would impair his ability to make independent judgments about the listed company’s executive compensation.”

 Compensation Committee Adviser Independence

The NYSE proposed rules related to compensation committee advisers provide that prior to hiring a compensation adviser, the compensation committee must consider the six factors set forth in Rule 10C-1(b)(4).  The NYSE proposed rules do not add any factors for a compensation committee to consider prior to hiring an adviser, as the “Exchange believes that the list included in Rule 10C-1(b)(4) is very comprehensive and the proposed listing standard would also require the compensation committee to consider any other factors that would be relevant to the adviser’s independence from management.”

The NYSE’s proposed new rules are subject to SEC review and comment.  We believe it is unlikely that the SEC will have many objections to the proposed rules, as they essentially mirror the SEC’s rules.  In light of the NYSE proposed rules, NYSE listed companies should be reviewing their compensation committee charters, the composition of the compensation committee and their relationships with the compensation advisers in order to identify whether any modifications or changes may be in order to comply with the coming NYSE standards.

NASDAQ Speaks – Potential Changes to Compensation Committee Rules and Roll-out of New and Improved Reference Library

At the “NASDAQ Speaks ’12: Latest Developments and Interpretations” webcast  held on June 7th, there were a couple of interesting items to note.  With respect to compensation committee rules, NASDAQ is considering the following changes, subject to the SEC adopting final rules under the Dodd-Frank Act and NASDAQ issuing proposed rules which become final:

  1. All companies will be required to have a compensation committee with at least 2 members.  This differs from the audit committee NASDAQ rule which requires at least 3 directors to serve on the audit committee.  Under the current NASDAQ rules, either  a compensation committee or  independent directors may approve or recommend executive compensation; and
  2. For a director to serve on the compensation committee, similar to the audit committee rules, such director will not be able to accept any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee, directly or indirectly, other than for board services.  Additionally, the board must consider affiliation a director has with the company.   NASDAQ does not think significant ownership of the company’s securities should bar a director from serving on the compensation committee.

This summer NASDAQ is also going to roll-out its new and improved reference library which will permit a user to search reference sources by category, such as staff interpretations, listing council decisions and frequently asked questions.  The new reference liability will have an advanced search feature allowing users to search across different reference sources, by year, category and sub-category and keywords.  The search results will be expandable and color coded by source.