Nasdaq Is Advocating for U.S. Public Market Reform

In May 2017, Nasdaq published a report titled The Promise of Market Reform: Reigniting America’s Economic Engine.  The report stems from Nasdaq’s concern about the state of U.S. pubic markets, which have become “more complex and costly for issuers, particularly for publicly-listed small and medium growth companies and for private companies that might consider public offerings.”

The report emphasizes that “companies increasingly question whether the benefits of public ownership are worth the burdens” and warns that if such burdens are not addressed, it “could ultimately represent an existential threat to our markets” as “a growing number of companies have been choosing to remain private—and some public companies are reversing course and going private.”

But Nasdaq’s report does not just create an alarm, it sets forth a blueprint for “critically-needed reforms.”

The report identifies the following three specific problems and offers concrete solutions in these areas:

(i) a complex patchwork of regulation disincentivizes market participation and creates the need to reconstruct the regulatory framework;

(ii) a one-size-fits-all market structure deprives companies of the benefits they need to participate in public markets (particularly for small and medium growth companies), which can be fixed by modernizing the market structure; and

(iii) a culture in the investment community and in the mainstream media that values short-term returns that should be changed to promote long-termism.

For example, Nasdaq suggests that the reconstruction of the regulatory framework would involve: (i) reforming the proxy proposal process; (ii) reducing the burden of corporate disclosure; (iii) rolling back politically-motivated disclosure requirements; (iv) reducing the burden of meritless class action lawsuits; and (v) a tax reform to incentivize long-term investing.

The implementation of most Nasdaq-suggested reforms would involve a lengthy rulemaking process, but it’s important that a dialogue about these issues “among investors, public and private companies, industry groups, and policymakers” has been launched.



NYSE Proposes New Global Market Capitalization Test for Listing Companies

On September 30, 2014, the SEC published an NYSE amendment, effective as of such publication, to adopt a new initial listing standard, and to eliminate all but one of the current NYSE initial listing standards, for US operating companies.

The amendment provides for a global market capitalization test to serve as a new initial listing standard for US operating companies. The global market capitalization test requires that a listing operating company have a minimum total global market capitalization of $200 million at the time of initial listing. A company that is already publicly traded at the time it applies to list on the NYSE must meet the $200 million global market capitalization requirement for at least 90 consecutive trading days immediately preceding the date on which it receives clearance to submit an application to list on the NYSE.

The amendment also eliminates four of the NYSE’s five current initial listing standards for US operating companies: (1) the valuation/revenue with cash flow test, (2) the pure valuation/revenue test, (3) the affiliated company test, and (4) the assets and equity test.

Despite the proposed global market capitalization test, companies listing must also meet both the existing distribution requirements of Section 102.01A, and the stock price and market value of publicly-held shares requirements of Section 102.01B, of the Listed Company Manual. In addition, companies listing under the proposed global market capitalization test must comply with all other applicable NYSE listing rules.

The notes relating to the amendment highlight that Nasdaq and Nasdaq Global Market have a competitive advantage over the NYSE under existing listing standards, particularly with respect to pre-revenue research and development companies. The amendment, and the implementation of the global market capitalization test, is the NYSE’s attempt to level the playing field.

Is the SEC Doing Enough to Promote Capital Formation?

If you believe Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher, the answer is an emphatic “no”, at least with respect to small businesses. On September 17, 2014, at a Heritage Foundation event, Commission Gallagher gave a speech criticizing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s failure to adequately promote capital formation by small businesses:

[S]adly, we at the SEC are not doing nearly enough to ensure that small businesses have the access to capital that they need to grow. We layer on rule after rule until it becomes prohibitively expensive to access the public capital markets.

After noting that not all of the regulatory burden is the SEC’s fault as “much of the ever-growing rulebook is a direct result of congressional mandates,” Commissioner Gallagher makes a number of recommendations for the SEC. Highlights include recommendations to:

  • Withdraw the proposed amendments to Regulation D. (Commission Gallagher did not support the proposed amendments as he stated in the SEC’s July 10, 2013 open meeting.)
  • Consider more deeply Regulation D, including considering broadening the blue sky exemption to help make the choice between the various exemptions available under Regulation D more meaningful.  According to Commissioner Gallagher, nearly all Regulation D offerings are conducted under Rule 506, even though 2/3 of the offerings are small enough that they could have been conducted pursuant to Rule 504 or 505, because Rule 506 offerings are exempt from blue sky regulations.
  • Analyze the secondary market for private company shares, where innovation has slowed. “We need more facilities to improve trading among accredited investors in the private secondary market.”
  • Finish implementing the JOBS Act’s reforms to Regulation A and couple the reforms with the formation of venture exchanges (national exchanges with listing rules tailored for smaller companies, including those issuing shares issued pursuant to Regulation A). Commission Gallagher noted that the SEC had proposed a robust set of rules, including blue sky preemption in certain larger Regulation A Offerings. (Commissioner Gallagher also noted, with respect to the proposal for blue sky exemption, that an “outpouring of anger from state regulators . . . wasn’t unexpected. After all, state regulators have been “protecting” investors from investment opportunities that are too risky for decades – I’m sure the Massachusetts residents who missed out on the offering of Apple Computer in 1980 because of their regulator’s concerns about the risk know this all too well.”)
  • Reconsider the current thresholds for scaled disclosure and the amount of disclosure that is required at each level – including having two tiers of scaling: significant scaling of disclosure for “nanocap” companies (i.e., companies with market capitalizations of up to $50 million) and moderate scaling for “microcap” companies with market capitalizations of $50 million to $300 million.

Coincidently, the SEC released its 2014 – 2018 Strategic Plan on September 19, 2014, two days after Commissioner Gallagher’s speech. Featured on the cover of the Strategic Plan is the SEC’s mission statement – “Protecting investors, maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitating capital formation” (emphasis added).

But, judging by the SEC’s own Strategic Plan and its current rulemaking agenda, it is unlikely that the SEC will be vigorously addressing many of Commissioner Gallagher’s concerns regarding capital formation for small businesses in the near future.

Recent Panel Discussion of Enhancing the Audit Committee Report: A Call to Action

On April 22, 2014, the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance and the Center for Audit Quality, hosted a panel discussion of a recent report, Enhancing the Audit Committee Report: A Call to Action (Call to Action). The report was issued last November by the Audit Committee Collaboration, a group of organizations, including, among others, National Association of Corporate Directors, Association of Audit Committee Members, Inc., The Directors’ Council, and Center for Audit Quality. The Call to Action encourages all public company audit committees to “voluntarily and proactively improve their public disclosures to more effectively convey … the critical aspects of the important work that they currently perform.”

Generally, the only public company disclosures that an audit committee is required to make consist of (i) an audit committee report under Item 407(d)(3) of Regulation S-K, which is included in the proxy statement, and (ii) a copy of the audit committee’s charter mandated by the stock exchange on which the company’s stock is listed. The committee’s charter is usually posted on the company’s website (or it may be included as an appendix to the company’s proxy statement). Item 407 requires that only information about the audit committee’s discussions with management and independent auditors, the committee’s recommendation to the board that the audited financial statements be included in the company’s annual report on Form 10-K, and the name of each member of the audit committee.

Based on its review of 2013 proxy statements, the Call to Action provides examples of audit committee reports that expanded the limited required disclosure by clarifying the scope of the audit committee’s duties, clearly defining the audit committee’s composition and providing relevant information about: 

  • factors considered when selecting or reappointing an audit firm
  • selection of the lead audit engagement partner
  • factors considered when determining auditor compensation
  • how the committee oversees the external auditor
  • the evaluation of the external auditor

Panelists’ views ranged from encouraging audit committees to take a fresh look at their audit committee reports and add some of the foregoing suggested disclosures to make the reports more transparent to concerns about disclosure overload and potential lawsuits.

NASDAQ Proposes to Align its Independence Standards for Compensation Committee Members with the NYSE’s Approach to Such Standards

On November 26, 2013, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC proposed to amend its listing rules on compensation committee composition (Rule 5605(d)(2)(A) and IM-5605-6) to replace the prohibition on the receipt of compensatory fees by compensation committee members with a requirement that a board of directors instead consider the receipt of such fees when determining eligibility for compensation committee membership.  NASDAQ cited the feedback that it had received from listed companies as the reason for these changes.  The proposed rules are almost identical to the NYSE’s rules related to compensation committee independence and, if adopted, would remove the anomaly of NASDAQ listing rules being more stringent than NYSE rules.

The proposed Rule 5605(d)(2)(A) states that in affirmatively determining the independence of any compensation committee member, the board must consider all factors specifically relevant to determining whether a director has a relationship to the company which is material to that director’s ability to be independent from management in connection with the duties of a compensation committee member, including, but not limited to:

  • the source of compensation of such director, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee paid by the company to such director; and
  • whether such director is affiliated with the company, a subsidiary of the company or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the company.

In IM-5605-6, NASDAQ proposes to clarify that when considering the sources of a director’s compensation in determining compensation committee member independence, the board should consider whether the director receives compensation from any person or entity that would impair the director’s ability to make independent judgments about the company’s executive compensation, including compensation for board or board committee services. 

The approach to the affiliation prong of the independence analysis is not significantly changed in the proposed rules.  However, NASDAQ proposes to revise IM-5605-6 to explain that the board should consider whether the affiliate relationship places the director under the direct or indirect control of the company or its senior management, or creates a direct relationship between the director and members of senior management, in each case of a nature that would impair the director’s ability to make independent judgments about the company’s executive compensation.

Companies are required to comply with the compensation committee composition aspects of the NASDAQ rules by the earlier of their first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014.  NASDAQ intends to implement the proposed changes before companies suggest changes to board and committee composition in connection with their 2014 annual meetings.

Companies Listing on the NYSE Can Appoint an Internal Auditor Within a Year after an IPO

On August 22, 2013, the SEC approved the NYSE’s proposal that permits a company listing in conjunction with an IPO to comply with the internal audit function requirement of Section 303A.07(c) of the NYSE Listed Company Manual within one year of the listing date.  NYSE rules now require such company to have an internal audit function in place no later than the first anniversary of its listing date[1].  Previously, NYSE rules only required each listed company to have an internal audit function but did not provide any transition period for companies listing in connection with an IPO.  

The new one-year transition period for compliance with an internal audit function requirement expanded NYSE corporate governance provisions, to which a transition period applies in connection with an IPO.  Such provisions relate to the composition of the board of directors as well as the composition of the nominating, compensation and audit committees (see Section 303A.00). 

The NYSE believes that a transition period for establishing an internal audit function will make the company’s process of implementation of such function more effective and will reduce the costs it faces in its first year as a public company.  The NYSE also expects that this transition period would enable the company’s audit committee to play a significant role in the design and implementation of the company’s internal audit function. 

In case of a company availing itself of a one-year transition period with respect to its internal audit function, the audit committee must:

  • assist board oversight of the design and implementation of the internal audit function; and
  • meet periodically with the company personnel primarily responsible for the design and implementation of the internal audit function.

Once the company establishes its internal audit function, the audit committee must (i) assist board oversight of the performance of the company’s internal audit function, and (ii) meet periodically with internal auditors or other personnel responsible for the internal audit function.

In addition, if the listed company does not yet have an internal audit function because it is using the internal audit function transition period, the audit committee’s review with the independent auditor of any audit problems should include a discussion of management’s plans with respect to the responsibilities, budget and staffing of the internal audit function and its plans for the implementation of the internal audit function.  Once the transition period is over, the audit committee’s review with the auditors should include a discussion of the responsibilities, budget and staffing of the company’s internal audit function.

The audit committee should also discuss with the board management’s activities with respect to the design and implementation of the internal audit function during the transition period, and after the transition period, the audit committee should review with the full board any issues that arise with respect to the performance of the internal audit function.

 Generally, a listed company must maintain an internal audit function to provide management and the audit committee with ongoing assessments of the company’s risk management processes and system of internal control, and the company can outsource an internal audit function to a third party service provider (other than the company’s independent auditor).   




[1] It is interesting to note that The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC (NASDAQ) does not have an internal audit function requirement.  Earlier this year, NASDAQ proposed, and later withdrew, an amendment to its listing requirements that each listed company establish and maintain an internal audit function to provide management and the audit committee with ongoing assessments of the company’s risk management processes and system of internal control.  The SEC received 42 comment letters on the proposal, and NASDAQ stated in its withdrawal that it was withdrawing the proposal to fully consider such comments and that it intends to file a revised proposal (see SEC Release No. 34-69792).

The July 1st Compliance Date for Certain of the New NASDAQ and NYSE Compensation Committee Rules is Around the Corner

On January 11, 2013, the SEC approved proposed changes to the listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ Stock Market related to compensation committees. Both exchanges created transition periods to comply with the new rules. We want to remind companies that the following new requirements take effect on July 1, 2013[1]:

Compensation Committee Charter Amendments

NASDAQ and NYSE listed companies will be required to comply with the new rules relating to the authority of a compensation committee to retain compensation consultants, legal counsel, and other compensation advisers; the authority to fund such advisers; and the responsibility of the committee to consider independence factors before selecting, or receiving advice from, such advisers[2].

NASDAQ.  The requirement that such authority and responsibilities of the compensation committee be included in the compensation committee’s written charter does not apply until a later date (see below) for NASDAQ listed companies.  Accordingly, NASDAQ listed companies should consider whether to grant such specific responsibilities and authority by July 1, 2013 through the adoption of a charter, the amendment to an existing charter, or by resolution or other board action. The requirement to adopt a compensation committee charter will not have to be complied with by NASDAQ listed companies until the earlier of their first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014.

NYSE NYSE listed companies will have to amend their existing charters by July 1, 2013 to address these additional rights and responsibilities of the compensation committee related to compensation consultants, legal counsel, and other compensation advisers.

Assessing the Independence of Compensation Consultants

The new NASDAQ and NYSE rules provide that the compensation committee may only select, or receive advice from, a compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other compensation adviser after considering the following factors[3]:

  • the provision of other services to the company by the person that employs the adviser;
  • the amount of fees received from the company by the person or firm that employs the adviser, as a percentage of the total revenue of the person or firm that employs the adviser;
  • the policies and procedures of the person or firm that employs the adviser that are designed to prevent conflict of interests;
  • any business or personal relationship of the adviser with a member of the compensation committee;
  • any stock of the company owned by the adviser; and
  • any business or personal relationships between the executive officers of the company and the adviser or the person or firm employing the adviser.

Compensation committees must conduct an independence assessment for all of its advisers, with limited exceptions for in-house counsel and compensation advisers that act in a role limited to (i) consulting on broad-based plans that are generally applicable to all salaried employees, or (ii) providing information that is either not customized for the issuer or that is customized based on parameters that are not developed by the adviser, and about which the adviser does not provide advice.

We note that in evaluating compensation committee adviser independence, the NYSE requires consideration of all factors relevant to an adviser’s independence from management, in addition to the six enumerated factors listed above. NASDAQ does not have a similar catch-all requirement.

Both NASDAQ and NYSE listed companies should assess the independence of their current advisers prior to July 1, 2013.  Ordinarily, this assessment will be performed before a potential adviser is selected and will then be re-assessed on an annual basis.  We would suggest utilizing a compensation committee questionnaire to solict information from the compensation consultant in order to complete this assessment. 


[1] The new compensation committee independence requirements do not need to be complied with by NASDAQ or NYSE listed companies until the earlier of their first annual meeting after January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014. Nevertheless,  NASDAQ and NYSE listed companies should begin preparing to comply with such new independence requirements. 


[2] To the extent a NASDAQ listed company does not have a compensation committee by July 1, 2013, this requirement will apply to the independent directors who determine, or recommend for the board’s determination, the compensation of the CEO and other executive officers of the company.


[3] To the extent a NASDAQ listed company does not have a compensation committee by July 1, 2013, this requirement will apply to the independent directors who determine, or recommend for the board’s determination, the compensation of the CEO and other executive officers of the company.


NYSE Proposes to Move to Only Website Disclosure of Listing Application Materials and to Otherwise Streamline its Listing Application Process

It has been a long-standing practice of the NYSE to post on its website the forms of the documents required to be submitted in connection with the NYSE listing applications. On April 30, 2013, the NYSE filed proposed rule changes to its Listed Company Manual (Manual), which, if adopted, will result in the Manual sections containing the listing application materials being deleted, and updated listing application materials will be posted only on the NYSE’s website. 

Although the NYSE amends its Manual from time to time, forms of listing agreements contained in the Manual have not always been amended to reflect changes made to the NYSE listing documents.  Some provisions in the listing agreements contained in the Manual are obsolete. The NYSE proposes to remove from the Manual (i) each of the agreements set forth in Sections 901.01 through 901.05, (ii) the form of original listing application contained in Section 903.01, and (iii) the form of supplemental listing application contained in Section 903.02. 

In the event that in the future the NYSE makes any substantive changes to those documents that are being removed from the Manual, it will submit a rule filing to the SEC to obtain approval of such changes, except for typographical or stylistic changes. The NYSE also plans to maintain all historical versions of those documents on its website after changes have been made, so that it will be possible to review how each document has changed over time. 

In addition, the NYSE proposes to state certain requirements, which it has been imposing as a matter of practice, in the Manual to add transparency to the listing process.  For example, the NYSE proposes to include in the Manual a new Section 107.00, Financial Disclosure and Other Information Requirements, which will contain the following requirements, among others:

  • Section 107.03 (SEC Compliance): No security shall be approved for listing if the issuer has not for the 12 months immediately preceding the date of listing filed on a timely basis all periodic reports required to be filed with the SEC or Other Regulatory Authority or the security is suspended from trading by the SEC pursuant to Section 12(k) of the Exchange Act.
  •  Section 107.04 (Exchange Information Requests): The NYSE may request any information or documentation, public or non-public, deemed necessary to make a determination regarding a security’s initial listing, including, but not limited to, any material provided to or received from the SEC or Other Regulatory Authority. A company’s security may be denied listing if the company fails to provide such information within a reasonable period of time or if any communication to the NYSE contains a material misrepresentation or omits material information necessary to make the communication to the NYSE not misleading. 

The NYSE also proposes to no longer require the following supporting documents in connection with an original listing application (see Section 702.04):

  •  Stock Distribution Schedule (the stock distribution schedule requirement is obsolete because the NYSE obtains the distribution information it needs from the applicant’s public filings and from its transfer agent). 
  • Certificate of Transfer Agent/Certificate of Registrar (the information that the NYSE needs about the applicant’s outstanding shares is available in its prospectus or periodic SEC reports, as well as the report of the applicant’s outstanding shares that will be required to be delivered to the Exchange once a quarter after listing). 
  • Notice of Availability of Stock Certificates (all transactions in listed securities in the national market system are conducted electronically through DTCC). 
  • Prospectus (final prospectuses are publicly available on the SEC’s website). 
  • Financial Statements (financial statements are included in the applicant’s SEC filings which are publicly available on the SEC’s website).


Update to Nasdaq Proposed Rule Relating to Internal Audit Function

As we discussed previously in our recent Up to Date  issue, the Nasdaq Stock Market recently proposed a rule that would require Nasdaq listed companies to establish and maintain an internal audit function. The proposal provides that each company listed on Nasdaq on or before June 30, 2013 establish an internal audit function by no later than December 31, 2013. Companies listed after June 30, 2013 would be required to estab­lish an internal audit function prior to listing. The SEC was scheduled to approve or disapprove such proposed rule on or before April 22, 2013. However, on April 18, 2013, the SEC designated June 6, 2013, as the date by which the SEC should either approve or disapprove or institute proceedings to determine whether to disapprove the proposed rule change.

I’ve Got Too Much Disclosure on My Hands

Throughout the years, much has been written about disclosure overload driven by securities and accounting rules, including reports by auditors and scholarly research.  From time to time, even Securities and Exchange Commissioners have been known to discuss the perils of disclosure overload.  One such Commissioner is Troy A. Paredes.

In his comments before the annual SEC Speaks in 2013 conference held on February 22, 2013, SEC Commissioner Paredes once again discussed his concerns about overloading the investing public with too much information.  In summarizing his concerns about over-disclosure, Commissioner Paredes offered the following suggestion:  “In fashioning the disclosure regime at the core of the federal securities laws, we must account for the fact that too much disclosure, particularly when it is too complex, can be counterproductive.  . . .  It would be better for investors to be provided with shorter, more manageable SEC filings, for example, rather than the lengthy documents they receive today.”  If you listen carefully, I think you may be able to hear a collective cheer of approval from corporate America. 

For those that are interested, Commissioner Paredes made similar remarks in October 2011 while presenting the A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities and Financial Law at Fordham University School of Law.