On April 29, 2015, the SEC, in a 3-2 vote of the SEC Commissioners, approved proposed rules (the “pay-versus-performance disclosure”) that would require an issuer to disclose the relationship between the issuer’s executive compensation and the issuer’s financial performance. The proposed rules would implement a disclosure obligation required under Section 953(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Chair White noted, in the SEC press release announcing the proposed rules, that the pay-versus-performance disclosure “would better inform shareholders and give them a new metric for assessing a company’s executive compensation relative to its financial performance.”
In particular, the proposed rules would amend Item 402 of Reg. S-K by adding a new Item 402(v) which would require issuers to disclose, in each proxy or information statement requiring executive compensation disclosure under Item 402 of Reg. S-K, the following:
- the executive compensation “actually paid” to the issuer’s principal executive officer (“PEO”);
- the executive compensation “actually paid” to the issuer’s named executive officers (“NEOs” ), expressed as an average for all such NEOs;
- the issuer’s total shareholder return (“TSR” ); and
- the TSR of a peer group of issuers.
Like all disclosures required under Item 402 of Reg. S-K, the pay-versus-performance disclosure would be subject to the say-on-pay advisory vote.
Compensation Actually Paid
Under the proposed rules, the executive compensation “actually paid” by an issuer means the total compensation for a particular executive disclosed in the summary compensation table adjusted by certain amounts related to pensions and equity awards. The adjusted disclosure represents an attempt by the SEC to reflect the compensation awarded to, or earned by, such executive officer in a particular year of service. In order to calculate the compensation “actually paid” to a particular executive officer, the total compensation disclosed for such executive officer in the summary compensation table would be adjusted to:
- deduct the aggregate change in the actuarial present value of all defined benefit and actuarial pension plans reported in the Summary Compensation Table;
- add back the actuarially determined service cost for services rendered by the executive officer during the applicable year;
- exclude the grant date value of any stock and option awards granted during the applicable year that are subject to vesting; and
- add back the value at vesting of stock and option awards that vested during the applicable year, computed in accordance with the fair value guidance in FASB ASC Topic 718.
An issuer would need to include footnotes to the pay-versus-performance summary table (see below for the form table) which describes the amounts excluded from and added to the total compensation reported in the summary compensation and the issuer’s vesting date valuation assumptions used (if materially different from the grant date assumptions disclosed in the issuer’s financial statements).
In addition to the required disclosure, an issuer would be permitted to make disclosures to capture the issuer’s specific situation and industry, provided that any supplemental disclosure is not misleading and not presented more prominently than the required pay-versus-performance disclosure. Examples of supplemental disclosure provided in the proposed rules include the disclosure of “realized pay” or “realizable pay” or additional years of data beyond the time periods required.
The peer group utilized for the TSR comparison would be the same peer group used by the issuer in its stock performance graph or in describing the issuer’s benchmarking compensation practices in its CD&A.
The pay-versus-performance disclosure must be provided in tabular form as set forth below.
||Summary Compensation Table Total For PEO(b)
||Compensation Actually Paid to PEO(c)
||Average Summary Compensation Table Total for non PEO Named Executive Officers(d)
||Average Compensation Actually Paid to non PEO Named Executive Officers(d)
||Total Shareholder Return(f)
Peer Group Total Shareholder Return
Following the pay-versus-performance disclosure table, the issuer would be required to describe the relationship between the issuer’s executive compensation actually paid and the issuer’s TSR and the relationship between the issuer’s TSR and the peer group’s TSR.
Issuers will generally need to make the pay-versus-performance disclosure for its five (or three years, in the first applicable filing following the effectiveness of the proposed rule) most recently completed fiscal years. However, smaller reporting companies will only need to make the disclosure for three years (or two years, in the first applicable filing following the effectiveness of the proposed rule). In addition, a smaller reporting company would not be required to (i) disclose amounts relating to pensions (consistent with current executive compensation disclosure obligations); nor (ii) present the TSR of a peer group in its pay-versus-performance disclosure.
Companies would be required to tag the pay-versus-performance disclosure using XBRL. Smaller reporting companies would not be required to comply with the tagging requirement until the third filing in which the pay-versus-performance disclosure is provided.
Companies to which Disclosure Requirement Applies
The proposed pay-versus-performance disclosure rules would apply to all reporting companies, except registered investment companies, foreign private issuers and emerging growth companies.
It is unclear whether the pay-versus-performance disclosure will be adopted (and in effect) in time for the 2016 proxy season. The SEC is seeking comments on the proposed rules for 60 days following their publication in the Federal Register.