On November 16, 2012, the ISS released its final 2013 Updates to its U.S. Corporate Governance Policy. ISS also will release a FAQ document in December 2012 for further guidance. The Updates will be effective for meetings on or after February 1, 2013.
Highlights of the 2013 Updates include:
• Stock Pledges/Hedges: In response to comments, ISS will be taking a case-by-case approach in determining whether pledging of company shares rises to a level of serious concern for shareholders. Also in response to comments, ISS is including significant pledging of company stock as a failure of risk oversight and thus considered a governance failure for which directors should be held accountable (rather than communicating concern through a say-on-pay recommendation as originally proposed). However, hedging of company stock, through covered call, collar or other derivative transactions, will be considered a problematic practice warranting a negative voting recommendation on the election of directors.
• Failure to Act on Shareholder Proposals: ISS will keep its current policy in effect for 2013, with some modifications: ISS will recommend a negative vote for individual directors, committee members or the entire board, if the board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of either (i) a majority of the outstanding shares or (ii) a majority of the votes cast in the last year and one of the two previous years. Beginning in 2014, ISS will recommend a vote negative vote if the board failed to act on a shareholder proposal that received the support of a majority of shares cast in the previous year. Under the Update, the ISS now has the flexibility to recommend a negative vote on members of the board as deemed appropriate, not necessarily the full board. The ISS also has included more guidance on the case-by-case examination of the sufficiency of a company’s action in response to a majority-supported shareholder proposal.
• Peer Groups: The new methodology incorporates information from companies’ self-selected pay benchmarking peer groups in order to identify and prioritize Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry groups beyond the subject company’s own GICS classification. The methodology draws peers from the subject company’s GICS group as well as from GICS groups represented in the company’s peer group, while maintaining the approximate proportions of these industries in the final peer group where possible. The methodology additionally focuses initially at an 8-digit GICS resolution to identify peers that are more closely related in terms of industry. Finally, when selecting peers, the methodology prioritizes peers that maintain the company near the median of the peer group, are in the subject company’s peer group, and that have chosen the subject company as a peer. The peer group methodology maintains its focus on identifying companies that are reasonably similar to the subject company in terms of industry profile, size, and market capitalization. Other changes to the peer group methodology include using slightly relaxed size requirements, especially at very small and very large companies, and using revenue instead of assets for certain financial companies.
• Realizable Pay: Realizable pay is being added to the research report for large capitalization companies. Realizable pay will consist of the sum of relevant cash and equity-based grants and awards made during a specified performance period being measured, based on equity award values for actual earned awards, or target values for ongoing awards, calculated using the stock price at the end of the performance measurement period. Stock options or stock appreciation rights will be revalued using the remaining term and updated assumptions, as of the performance period, using the Black-Scholes Option Pricing model. The realizable pay consideration may mitigate or exacerbate the CEO’s pay for performance concerns.
• Voting on “Say on Golden Parachute” Proposals: The Update will (i) include existing change-in-control arrangements maintained with named executive officers rather than focusing only on new or extended arrangements and (ii) place further scrutiny on multiple legacy problematic features (e.g. single trigger equity, tax gross –ups, etc.) in change in control agreements.